Based on quantum uncertainty and quantum entanglement, an quantum allor-nothing oblivious transfer protocol is proposed. It is illustrated in detail that the protocol is unconditionally secure. The distinct merit of the present protocol lies in that it is not based on quantum bit commitment. The full utilization of the entanglement makes the protocol different from previous insecure ones, thus its security is not restricted by the no-go theorem of twoparty secure computations.
able to get b with R = 100% with the probability p = 1/2, and has zero knowledge on the value of b with the probability (1 − p). Note that zero knowledge does not mean R = 0. According to information theory, the required Shannon information [20] for getting one bit of information with reliability R is I = 1−[−R log 2 R−(1−R) log 2 (1−R)]. When I = 0 this formula gives R = 50%. This is not difficult to be understood, since when Bob simply guesses the value of b basing on nothing at all, he already stands 50% chance to be correct. Therefore in OT, the average reliability R av is not equal to p, but p × 100% + (1 − p) × 50% = (1 + p)/2. For p = 1/2, R av = 75%.
Consider that Alice sends Bob some quantum states described by the density matrix ρ b depending on the value of b. To learn b, Bob needs to distinguish ρ 0 and ρ 1 . The upper bound (Holevo bound) of the average information he can get is calculated by I av (ρ 0 , ρ 1 ) = S[(ρ 0 + ρ 1 )/2] − [S(ρ 0 ) + S(ρ 1 )]/2 with a von Neumann entropy S(ρ b ) = −T r(ρ b log 2 ρ b ) [20] . The average reliability R av (ρ 0 , ρ 1 ) of b obtained by Bob is bounded by the equation −R av (ρ 0 , ρ 1 ) log 2 R av (ρ 0 , ρ 1 )−[1−R av (ρ 0 , ρ 1 )] log 2 [1−R av (ρ 0 , ρ 1 )] = 1−I av (ρ 0 , ρ 1 ). The probability p max , which describes the maximum probability for Bob to get b with the reliability 100%, can be calculated through p max (ρ 0 , ρ 1 ) = 2R av (ρ 0 , ρ 1 ) − 1. Therefore in principle, any transmission that involves two density matrices ρ 0 and ρ 1 with I av (ρ 0 , ρ 1 ) < 1 can be used to implement an OT protocol in which Bob's probability to get b successfully is p max (ρ 0 , ρ 1 ). However, there is no guarantee that the Holevo bound can always be reached within finite steps of physical operations for any quantum system, especially when Bob needs to obtain sufficient indications from these operations to show him the exact reliability of the results he gets. Thus to build a practical OT, we generally need a set of states with ρ 0 and ρ 1 which give p max (ρ 0 , ρ 1 ) > 1/2. As long as the upper bound of the probability for Bob to get b with R = 100% is 1/2, the protocol is secure. On the other hand R av 75% cannot be expected at the same time, if a dishonest Bob would like to achieve a higher R av value by sacrificing his probability to get b with R = 100% (see Bob's strategy below).
With these understandings, a two-qubit system is already sufficient to meet most of the basic requirements of OT. Consider an ideal case, in which no transmission error occurs. Let |0 + and |1 + denote the two orthogonal states of a qubit, where + stands for the rectilinear basis. Define
, where × stands for the diagonal basis. We put forward the following protocol:
Protocol A: Naive Protocol -1 (A-1) Alice randomly picks r ∈ {0, 1} and sends Bob two qubits |r 1 q 1 |r 2 q 2 = |r + |r
(A-2) Bob tries to project the two qubits into the two Bell states To see how the protocol works, let us expand all the four possible choices for |r 1 q 1 |r 2 q 2 in the Bell basis as:
As the four Bell states Φ ± and Ψ ± are orthogonal to each other, when projecting them into Φ − , |0 × |0 × and |1 × |1 × are not affected, while |0 + |0 + and |1 + |1 + stand probability 1/2 to be projected successfully; if none of the two states are found to be Φ − , both collapse into Φ + . If the projection fails, one more projection to Ψ + is performed. |0 + |0 + and |1 + |1 + , are not affected, while |0 × |0 × and |1 × |1 × stand probability 1/2 to be projected successfully; if the projection fails again, they collapse into Φ + as well. Whether these projections succeed or not is determined by the quantum uncertainty, and is out of the control of either participant. When step (A-2) is finished, the probability for Bob to identify the value of b with the reliability 100% is 1/2. For the other 1/2 probability, the final state is always Φ
+ no matter what the initial state |r 1 q 1 |r 2 q 2 is. Therefore further distinguishing on the state is impossible for Bob, and he has zero knowledge on b.
Likewise, we are also interested in the following variation:
Protocol B: Naive Protocol -2 (B-1) Alice randomly picks q ∈ {+, ×} and sends Bob two qubits |r 1 q 1 |r 2 q 2 = |b q |b q ; (B-2) Bob tries to project the two qubits into |0 × |0 + and |1 × |1 + ; (B-3) If the outcome is |0 × |0 + (|1 × |1 + ), Bob knows that b = 0 (b = 1); else if the projection fails, he knows nothing about b.
In this protocol the same qubit |b q is sent to Bob twice, one of them is measured in the + basis, and the other in the × basis. Obviously there is always one qubit which is measured in the correct basis, and the outcome is equal to b. Meanwhile, the other qubit is measured in the wrong basis. Due to the quantum uncertainty, the outcomes b andb occur with probability 1/2. If the outcomes for the two qubits are the same, Bob knows that they must be equal to b with the reliability 100%; if the two outcomes are different, he does not know which qubit is measured in the correct basis so that he knows nothing about b. Therefore the goal of OT is also achieved.
The security against Bob in these two protocols can be analyzed as follows. (i) The security does not depend on the security of bit commitment. Alice's action does not depend on any commitment of Bob, so there is no need to concern with the MLC no-go theorem of quantum bit commitment; (ii) Bob cannot always got the value of b. In Protocol A, the density matrices for b = 0, 1 are ρ 0 = (|0 + |0 + 0| + 0| + + |1 + |1 + 1| + 1| + )/2 and max ∽ 0.888 respectively, no matter which kinds of coherent attacks or joint measurements he may apply; (iii) If Bob wants to get b with the reliability 100%, the actual probability for him to succeed through finite physical operations is bounded by 1/2. It can be proved that the optimal strategy for Bob to identify ρ 0 with the reliability 100%, is to measure the states in the basis in which ρ 1 is diagonalized. Suppose ρ 0 and ρ 1 are already expressed in this basis and ρ(i, j) denote the element of the matrix ρ, the maximum probability for Bob to identify ρ 0 is p 0 max =
Similarly, expressing ρ 0 and ρ 1 in the basis in which ρ 0 is diagonalized, the maximum probability for Bob to identify ρ 1 with the reliability 100% is p 1 max = i|ρ 0 (i,i)=0 ρ 1 (i, i). Then the probability for Bob to identify b is p (p 0 max + p 1 max )/2. In Protocol A, ρ 0 and ρ 1 can be diagonalized simultaneously, making it possible to reach p 0 max and p 1 max in the same measurement. It is shown that p 0 max = p 1 max = 1/2. Thus p = 1/2 is the maximum value that can be found in this protocol. In Protocol B, ρ 0 and ρ 1 cannot be diagonalized simultaneously, so that the proof is not straightforward. But we can see that in step (B-2), whenever the projection succeeds, Bob immediately get 1 bit of information; whenever the projection fails, ρ 0 and ρ 1 collapse to the same density matrix, i.e. the upper bound of the average information that can be gained from the resultant final states is zero. This fact shows that Bob has already drawn as much information as possible from the states he received. Therefore the strategy in Protocol B is exactly the optimal one for Bob to get b with the reliability 100%.
However, as the theoretical values of R A av and R B av are both larger than 75%, a dishonest Bob can gain a higher R av value than he does when he is honest, as far as he no longer expects the probability to get b with the reliability 100% to be 1/2. For example, in Protocol B he can project the two-qubit state into |0 × |0 + and (|1 × |0 + + √ 2 |0 + |1 + )/ √ 3, which belongs to the basis that makes ρ 1 diagonalized. The probability to find ρ 0 as these two states is 2/3, which is the maximum value in identifying ρ 0 with the reliability 100%, as ρ 1 will not collapse into the space formed by these two vectors. If the projection fails, though the resultant state can no longer be distinguished by Bob, the original state stands probability 3/4 to be ρ 1 . If he always guesses b = 1 when the projection fails, the reliability of the guess is 75%. Thus the total average reliability is given by R av = (
) × 75% ∽ 83.3%, which exceeds the value 75% that he will obtain once he executes the protocol honestly. But with this strategy he can never identify ρ 1 with the reliability 100%, thus the total probability for him to get b with the reliability 100% is merely p = (2/3 + 0)/2 = 1/3. Clearly, such strategy should not be considered as a successfully cheating because Bob does not even accomplish the basic task of OT.
Nevertheless, these protocols are called naive because Alice may not prepare the qubits honestly. In Protocol A, if Alice prepares the two qubits as |r 1 q 1 |r 2 q 2 = Φ − (or Ψ + ), Bob will always receive b successfully; or if she prepares |r 1 q 1 |r 2 q 2 = Φ + , Bob will never get b. Similar strategy is also valid in Protocol B. That is, by preparing the qubits in a dummy state (i.e., Alice herself cannot even tell exactly whether it is |0 + |0 + , or |1 + |1 + , or |0 × |0 × , or |1 × |1 × ), she can control the probability for Bob to get b and spoil the protocol.
To avoid such cheating, the two protocols need to be combined together. Note that the initial state |r 1 q 1 |r 2 q 2 in both protocols are chosen from the same group of the four states. Supposing that Bob is given the freedom to execute Protocol A or B at his choice, it is obvious that Alice cannot know this choice of action at all. Only the one-way communication from Alice to Bob is involved as Bob never sends out anything. If Alice has a method to learn any non-trivial information on which protocol Bob has followed, a superluminal signal transferred from Bob to Alice can be realized, which conflicts with the principle of special theory of relativity and thus is impossible. Therefore Alice does not know whether Bob has decoded the basis q or the polarization r of the qubits |r 1 q 1 |r 2 q 2 . If a dishonest Alice is asked to announce what is the form of the initial state she sent, she will have a hard time since she does not know which legal choice the dummy state can be projected to. Her guess stands a non-trivial probability to conflict with Bob's measurement. Repeating the protocols and the verification procedure many times can ensure the probability to be exponentially small for the dummy state attack to be successful.
On the other hand, to prevent Bob from getting any advantage from the verification procedure, he needs to be forced to complete his measurement before Alice gives the announcement. This can be done by asking him to show whether he had already decoded any information (q or r) from the qubits with the reliability 100%. It can be proved that, Bob can never decode q and r simultaneously with the reliability 100% [21] . Also as shown before, the probability for Bob to get either q or r with the reliability 100% is bounded by 1/2. Thus when the protocols are run n rounds and Bob is required to point out in which n ′ ∽ n/2 rounds he has got either q or r with the reliability 100%, he has to follow the protocols honestly. In brief, the entire verification process is:
(i) Alice randomly picks q i ∈ {+, ×}, r i ∈ {0, 1} and sends Bob |r i q i |r i q i ; (ii) Bob randomly picks c i ∈ {0, 1} and executes Protocol A to decode q i (executes Protocol B to decode r i ) if c i = 0 (c i = 1); (iii) If the decoding fails, Bob tells Alice to discard the data for this index i; else they keep the data; END DO (V-2) If the number of the remaining {q i , r i , c i } is n ′ ∽ n/2 they continue; else if n ′ is too far away from n/2 they abort the procedure; (V-3) For the remaining n ′ groups of {q i , r i , c i }, DO (i) Alice randomly picks an index i and asks Bob to announce either q i or r i depending on the value of c i .
(ii) Bob randomly picks another index i and asks Alice to announce both q i and r i ; END DO (Repeat (i) and (ii) until only one group of {q i , r i , c i } (denoted as {q 0 , r 0 , c 0 }) left unverified.) (V-4) If {no conflicting results were found by both participants} AND {the probabilities for c i = 0 and c i = 1 to occur are approximately the same} AND {the probabilities for |r i q i |r i q i = |0 + |0 + , |r i q i |r i q i = |1 + |1 + , |r i q i |r i q i = |0 × |0 × and |r i q i |r i q i = |1 × |1 × to occur are approximately the same}, they keep the only remaining group of unannounced data {q 0 , r 0 , c 0 } for further oblivious transfer.
In this procedure, since all the data groups {q i , r i , c i } are independent from each other for different i, the total density matrix is simply the direct product of the density matrices of the states for each i. Then the above information theory analysis is still valid. As a result, if Alice uses the dummy state attack frequently, the probability for her to escape from being caught is exponentially small. If she only uses the attack very occasionally, as the remaining {q 0 , r 0 , c 0 } is randomly chosen among the n ′ groups of data, it may not be the one that Alice used. Thus her attack makes no sense. In either cases, the probability for Alice to cheat successfully is arbitrarily small by increasing n. For instance, Alice sends the dummy state Φ + with frequency δ. And whenever a dummy state is involved in step (ii) of (V-3), she announces q i = r i = 0 or 1 randomly. The probability for {q 0 , r 0 , c 0 } to meet a dummy state is δ, and the probability for all the rest dummy states to pass the verification is about (1/2) δn ′ −1 . Thus the total probability for Alice to cheat successfully is δ(1/2) δn ′ −1 , which is exponentially small as n → ∞. On the other hand, if Bob did not follow Protocol A or B honestly, there are inevitably some i for which he did not know q i nor r i with the reliability 100%. Supposing that the actual reliability is R a (< 1), then the probability for him to pass the verification is about R n ′ /2 a , which is also exponentially small. But the communication in this procedure is no longer a simple one-way communication from Alice to Bob. Bob's announcement on whether he has decoded something with the reliability 100% gives Alice additional information. Therefore Alice needs no superluminal signals nor dummy states to help her knowing what happens at Bob's side. For each i, She introduces an incremental system α i entangled with |r i q i |r i q i . The general form of the state of the whole system is |ψ = f A |A |0
Alice sends Bob the last two qubits as |r i q i |r i q i , and keeps the first part on her side as α i . If the states |A , |B , |C and |D are nonorthogonal, it is equivalent to sending the dummy state with a certain frequency. It could not pass the verification with a non-trivial probability, so |A , |B , |C and |D are assumed to be orthogonal to each other as discussed below. It is trivial to show that for such a system, Alice can easily pass the verification with probability 1 by measuring α i in the basis {|A , |B , |C , |D }. Now let us focus on the situation when this system is finally chosen to be the one which generates the only group of unverified data {q 0 , r 0 , c 0 }. |ψ can be expressed as
Since Bob already included {q 0 , r 0 , c 0 } in what he decoded with the reliability 100%, if what he decoded is q 0 , i.e., he has chosen c 0 = 0, he must have found Φ − or Ψ + in his measurement. From this equation we can see that the system α i must have collapsed into
Similarly, |ψ can also be expressed as
It shows that if Bob has chosen c 0 = 1,
can know the value of c 0 , which reveals Bob's choice of action. Now let us evaluate the maximum probability for this distinguishing procedure. Define
Calculations show that the upper bound of the average information I av (ρ A , ρ B ) is optimal if Alice chooses
× } both ρ 0 and ρ 1 are diagonalized, so that p 0 max = p 1 max = 1/2 can be reached simultaneously, and the maximum probability for Alice to get c 0 with the reliability 100% is 1/2. The detail of Alice's method is: if α i is projected into |1 × |1 × (|0 × |0 × ), she knows that c 0 = 0 (c 0 = 1); otherwise (which happens with probability 1/2) she has zero knowledge about c 0 since α i always collapses into |0 × |1 × .
This result shows that, for the only group of data {q 0 , r 0 , c 0 } that remains after the verification procedure, Alice has the probability 1/2 to learn c 0 with the reliability 100% by using coherent attacks and therefore learns Bob's choice of action. Thus it is insecure to accomplish an OT process from Alice to Bob with {q 0 , r 0 , c 0 }. At the first glance, the data seem useless. But, on the contrary, if we make b be related to c 0 , Alice's coherent attacks become a legal and must-have method to fulfill an OT of b from Bob to Alice. As the entanglement between the qubits is already utilized to accomplish Alice's legal "cheating", no further cheating is possible, and unconditional security is achieved. To conclude, the entire protocol reads:
Protocol C: Secure OT (transferring a bit b from Bob to Alice) (C-1) Alice prepares n sets of qubits, where each set contains four qubits entangled as |ψ 1,i ψ 2,i ψ 3,i ψ 4,i = (
(C-2) Execute the Verification Procedure (Step (i) of (V-1) is replaced by: Alice keeps ψ 1,i ψ 2,i , and sends Bob ψ 3,i ψ 4,i as |r i q i |r i q i . Also in step (V-3), whenever an index i is picked for the verification, Alice measures ψ 1,i ψ 2,i in the basis {|0 + |0 + , |0 + |1 + , |1 + |0 + , |1 + |1 + }, and uses the result to calculate {q i , r i } that is corresponding to ψ 3,i ψ 4,i ) Then the two qubits at Alice's side, which is corresponding to the only group of unverified data {q 0 , r 0 , c 0 }, are denoted as Whether the participants can cheat in this protocol lies on whether they can cheat in the Verification Procedure. The security of that procedure is already well justified above. Briefly, n − 1 sets of qubits are all used for the verification, and until the very end of the procedure, neither participant knows which set will be the only one that finally left to be unverified. Therefore the cheating probability can be made arbitrary small by increasing n. Thus Protocol C is unconditionally secure.
An important feature of Protocol C is that it does not require Alice to finish the final measurement on ψ 1,0 ψ 2,0 at any time. Thus the event "Alice gets b or not" does not have a final result yet. The protocol only guarantees that no matter when she performs this measurement, no more information can be gained than what is allowed by the definition of all-or-nothing OT. That is why the protocol is called secure. But if one would insist that it is necessary to have a final result at the end of an OT process, we can perfect our protocol with some further steps similar to the above Verification Procedure, which forces the event "Alice gets b or not" to become a definitive result. The two participants execute steps (C-1) and (C-2), then Alice randomly chooses either to execute (C-3) to get c 0 , or to delay the measurement (so that she can measure ψ 1,0 ψ 2,0 later in the basis {|0 + |0 + , |0 + |1 + , |1 + |0 + , |1 + |1 + } and always obtain {q 0 , r 0 } with the reliability 100%). if Alice executes (C-3) but fails to get c 0 , they discard the data. This procedure is repeated many times until many groups of {q 0 , r 0 , c 0 } are produced; half of them Alice gets c 0 exactly, and the other half she can gets {q 0 , r 0 } exactly. Then Bob randomly picks most of these groups, asks Alice to announce the values she gets, and checks whether the probabilities for Alice to get c 0 (or {q 0 , r 0 }) is 1/2. Finally, Bob randomly picks one from the remaining groups, announces b ⊕ q 0 or b ⊕ r 0 (depending on which one he knows) and c 0 . Alice computes b if she has chosen to delay the measurement for this group. Since Alice never knows c 0 and {q 0 , r 0 } with the reliability 100% simultaneously, she will not know {q 0 , r 0 } and thus has zero knowledge on b if she has chosen to get c 0 for this group (which occurs with the probability 1/2). Note that for each group of qubits, the probability to get c 0 with the reliability 100% is smaller than 1. If Alice wants to cheat by always delaying the measurement, the probability for her to pass Bob's check can be made arbitrarily small, just like it was proven in the Verification Procedure above. In this sense the goal of OT is achieved, and "Alice gets b or not" becomes a definitive fact. The cost is that more qubits are needed than that of Protocol C. But in fact, this process can be inserted in the Verification Procedure (after step (V-2), and (V-3ii) also needs some modification) to use the qubits more efficiently.
Our protocol evades the no-go theorem of quantum secure computations [22, 23] possibly due to the following reason. In the models that denied by the theorem, the quantum state sent to the receiver is the eigenstate of the measurement operator that the receiver uses for determining b. Whenever the receiver gets b successfully, the quantum state is undisturbed so that further utilization of the state is possible (see e.g., Section II.C of Ref. [22] ). While in our protocol, the state is not an eigenstate of the projection used by the receiver. The receiver knows whether he gets b successfully only when the projection is performed, i.e., only when the entangled state is disturbed. Thus the protocol is secure against the cheating strategy in Ref. [22] .
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